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RECENT CASES
seeable as a result of the defendant's acts, but foreseeability is not
always required in proximate cause.15 Hence, it is plausible that a
causal relation did exist.
Other jurisdictions have refused to take the question of proximate
cause from the jury when reasonable men would differ in their in-
terpretation of the causal facts,16 and it is submitted that this is the
action that the Kentucky Court of Appeals should have taken. The
appellate court should not have reversed the lower court on the basis
of proximate cause because the facts of the instant case did not con-
stitute such a clear lack of a causal relation that the upper court
could say as a matter of law there was no proximate cause.
There are two conclusions to be established from the foregoing
analysis of the Graves case in light of the modem view that criminal
responsibility may be imposed for causing death by fright. First, the
court should have placed more emphasis (if procedurally possible)1'
on the nature of the defendant's act. By finding the act not to be
dangerous, the court could have reached the same result and could
have avoided the vexing problem of proximate cause. Second, since
the court did review the causal aspect of the case, it should not have
ruled as a matter of law that there was no causal connection between
the act and the death. Such a problem was for the jury, and the
finding of the circuit court on the issue of proximate cause should not
have been disturbed.
The court's ultimate decision seems to be correct, but its analysis
seems questionable since the case should have turned on the nature
of the act rather than the causal relationship.
LUTHR HousE
Co,_.r OF LAws-LnrrrAnoN OF AcroNs-"Bomown G" STATUTE-
Plaintiff, a resident of New Jersey, brought an action against de-
fendant Kentucky corporation in a United States District Court in
Kentucky, for recovery of damages for personal injuries arising out
of an accident that occurred in New Jersey on March 14, 1952. The
Kentucky statute of limitation for personal injuries is one year, whereas
in New Jersey the period is two years. Complaint was filed on March
13, 1954. The court overruled defendant's motion to dismiss the
action, based on the Kentucky statute of limitations, and in accord
with past Kentucky decisions, held that the Kentucky "borrowing"
RESTATEMENT, ToRTS, sec. 485 (1934); PRossER, TORTS, see. 48 (1941).
x In Re Heigho, supra note 5.
'7 Supra note 10.
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statute lengthens as well as shortens the limitation period of the
forum, depending upon the foreign limitation statute. Albanese v.
Ohio River-Frankfort Cooperage Corp., 125 F. Supp. 333 (W. D. Ky.
1954).
The common law rule was that statutes of limitation were to be
treated as procedural, affecting the remedy and not the right and
that therefore the limitation of the forum controlled.' Tolling pro-
visions in statutes of limitation, however, permitted plaintiffs to "shop
around" to find a forum in which an action would not be barred, even
though it would be barred at home.2 Such shopping around induced
most states to adopt so-called "borrowing" statutes, which provided
generally that if the cause of action was barred where it arose, then
it would be barred in the forum.' The vast majority of the states with
such borrowing statutes have construed them to borrow only to the
extent of providing an additional limitation on the forum's limitation
period.4 Thus, the lex fori would continue to rule, as it did under the
common law, if it provided a shorter period of limitation than did the
jurisdiction in which the cause of action arose. Only Kentucky has
held that the borrowing statute permits the lex loci to lengthen the
limitation period of the forum's limitation statuteY Thus, if the statute
of limitation is five years in the forum in which the action arises, and
only three years in the forum in which suit is started, Kentucky would
not bar the action at four years, whereas the other jurisdictions would
do so.
Maki v. George R. Cooke Co., 124 F. 2d 663 (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1942); Ley
v. Simmons, 249 S.W. 2d 808 (Ky. 1952); Oliver v. Crewdsons Adm'r, 256 Ky.
797, 77 S.W. 2d 20 (1934); Smith v. Baltimore and Ohio Ry. Co., 157 Ky. 113,
162 S.W. 564 (1914); Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Burkhart, 154 Ky. 92,
157 S.W. 18 (1913); Templeton v. Sharp, 10 Ky. L. Rep. 499 (1889); Con-
necticut Valley Lumber Co. v. Maine Cent. R.R., 78 N.H. 553, 103 At. 263
(1918); Tieffenbrun v. Flannery, 198 N.C. 397, 151 S.E. 857 (1930); 53 C.J.S.
970 (1948); 11 Am. Jun. 505 (1937); 75 A.L.R. 203 (1931); SToMERG, PRnlr-
CIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAws 147-148 (2d ed. 1951); GOODRICH, CoNrIaCr OF
LAws 240 (3rd ed. 1949); 63 HAstv. L. REv. 1177, 1260 (1950).
'63 HAnv. L. REv. 1177, 1264 (1950); 9 U. oF Cm. L. REv. 723, 725 (1942);
149 A.L.R. 1224, 1237 (1944).
'ALA. CODE tit. 7, sec. 37 (1940); Aruz. CODE ANNO. c. 29, sec. 307 (1939);
BURNs IND. STAT. ANNo. tit. 2, see. 606 (1946); Ky. REv. STAT. sec. 413.320(1953); PACE'S Omo REv. ANNO. tit. 23, sec. 2305.20 (1953); Wnrms TENN.
CODE ANNO. sec. 8607 (1934).
'Jenkins v. Thompson, 251 S.W. 2d 325 (Mo. 1952); Farthing v. Sams, 296
Mo. 442, 247 S.W. 111 (1922); Duggan v. Lubbin, 226 N.Y.S. 238 (1927);
Isenberg v. Ranier, 130 N.Y.S. 27 (1911); 53 C.J.S. 978 (1948); 11 Am. Jtm. 511
(1937); 149 A.L.R. 1224, 1237 (1944); 75 A.L.R. 203, 231 (1931); Satter, Limita-
tions in Illinois: the Tolling and Borrowing Provisions, 2 DEPAuL L.J. 225, 238
(1953); 63 HASv. L. l~v. 1177, 1264 (1950).
'Gibson v. Womack, 218 Ky. 626, 291 S.W. 1021 (1927); Smith v. Baltimore
& Ohio Ry. Co., supra note 1; Shillito Co. v. Richardson, 102 Ky. 51, 42 S.W. 847
(1897); Burton v. Miller, 185 F. 2d 817 (6th Cir. 1950).
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Under the Kentucky borrowing statute before 1942, there was a
requirement that both parties to the action had to be non-residents of
Kentucky when the cause of action accrued, in order for the statute
to be applicable." This meant that the statutes of limitation of the
lex fori would apply where one or both of the parties was a Kentucky
resident at the time that the action accrued.7 According to the court
in the principal case, the only significant amendment to the statute in
1942 was the deletion of the non-residence provision with respect to
causes of action arising in other states or countries.8 This meant, in
effect, that Kentucky, in bringing its own residents within the statute,
was abolishing the common law rule.
Although the court averred that there was no significant alteration
of the borrowing scope of the statute, it might be argued that enough
change was offered so as to indicate a need to follow the majority rule.
In the old statute the key words were "When... an action can not be
maintained thereon by reason of the lapse of time, no action can be
maintained thereon in this state,"9 and in the new statute the borrow-
ing words are "When . . . an action thereon is limited to a shorter
period of time than the period of limitation prescribed by the laws of
this state..., then said action shall be barred in this state at the expira-
tion of said shorter period."0 (Italics supplied by writer.) In both
statutes there are references to foreign statutes of limitation with
shorter periods than Kentucky's. Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude
that the first time the Kentucky court interpreted the statute to permit
enlargement of the Kentucky limitation period, it was reading some-
thing into the statute.. Moreover, the 1942 statute contains the word
'C.Anou.'s Ky. STAT. sec. 2542 (1936): "When a cause of action has arisen
in another state or country between residents of such state or country or between
them and residents of another state or country, and by the laws of the state or
country where the cause of action accrued an action cannot be maintained
thereon by reason of the lapse of time, no action can be maintained thereon in
this state."
"Hoerter v. Garrity, 155 Ky. 260, 159 S.W. 815 (1913); Louisville & Nash-
ville R.R. Co., v. Burkhart, supra note 1; Templeton v. Sharp, supra note 1;
Labatt v. Smith, 83 Ky. 599 (1886). 8125 F. Supp. 333, 334-335 (1954).
'Supra note 6. "Ky. REV. STAT. sec. 413.320 (1953).
' Shillito Co. v. Richardson, supra note 5, where, at page 53, 42 S.W. at 848,
the court stated: "It would seem from the foregoing that if the action was not
barred in such case by the statute of the State in which the cause of action
accrued that it would not be barred in a controversy between the same parties
in the courts of this State, and such seems to have been the opinion of the
Superior Court of Kentucky as announced in Labatt, & Co. v. Smith & Whitney,
4 Ky. Law Rep., 358." But the Labatt citation used by the court was only of an
abstract opinion. A complete opinion of the Labatt case appears in 4 Ky. Law
Rep. 422, where, at 428 the court states: "In the first place it will be noticed that
in no case do they enlarge the time within which the action is to be brought.
The foreign statute is only to apply where the limitation is less than that mentioned
in the Kentucky statute."
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
"shorter" at two different places, instead of the old usage of "lapse of
time." Such seems to be a clear indication of legislative intention to
limit the borrowing scope of the statute. The plain meaning of the
words seems to limit its application, so that outside of this application
the common law or lex fori should prevail. Such was indicated in
Farthing v. Sams,12 a 1922 Missouri case construing a similar borrow-
ing statute not to enlarge the Missouri limitation, where the court
asserted:
In order to apply the construction for which the plaintiff contends,
it would be necessary to imply certain negative statements in the
statute to the effect that, when a cause of action is not barred by the
laws of the state in which it originated, the statute of limitations of
this state cannot be applied in defense of the action.1 3 (Italics sup-
plied by writer.)
Another case which seems to indicate that Kentucky ought to fol-
low the majority rule on borrowing statutes is Ley v. Simmons,14 which,
although construing a different but related statute, provides some
strong dictum in line with the argument set out in the Farthing case.
KENTUCKY REvwsED STATUTE section 413.880, a borrowing statute that
limits its application to foreign judgments, contains language almost
identical with that found in the pre-1942 borrowing statute set out in
the instant case.15 The court held the Kentucky statute should govern
where the other state's statute of limitation is longer than Kentucky's,
pointing out that "The Legislature has not said that if the action can
be maintained in the other state it also can be maintained here."16
The court also added that such a holding is in accord with the great
weight of authority, and said further "we think the rule is sound."-7
The argument for the Kentucky interpretation of conflict of laws
application of statutes of limitations must ultimately rest upon the
contention that such statutes are really substantive, not procedural.'
The federal doctrine of Erie v. Tompkins,'" later clarified in Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York, 20 indicated that substantial effect on the outcome of
a case determines whether or not a law of a state is substantial or
procedural. In the York case, Justice Frankfurter held that a federal
'296 Mo. 442, 247 S.W. 111 (1922). 1'Id. 247 S.W. at 112.
' Supra note 1.
"Action on judgment barred here if barred where rendered; exception. If,
by the laws of any other state or country, an action upon a judgment or decree
rendered in that state or country cannot be maintained there by reason of -the
lapse of time, and the judgment or decree is incapable of being otherwise enforced
there, an action upon it may not be maintained in this state, except in favor of a
resident thereof who has had the cause of action from the time it accrued."
"Supra note 1, at 809. 7 Id. at 810.
189 U. oF Cm. L. REv. 728 (1942); 28 YA. E L.J. 492 (1919).
29804 U.S. 64 (1938). -8826 U.S. 99 (1945).
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court must follow the statute of limitations of the state in which it is
sitting. "A right which can be enforced no longer by an action at law
is shorn of its most valuable attribute."21 This manifestation of the
substantive nature of such statutes is also supported by other statute
of limitations problems. For example, where a statute creates a right
which was not existent at common law and also limits the life of that
right, the lcx fori does not control.22 It is said that the condition is
attached to and follows the right.23 Some cases have even permitted
lex loci control although the limitation upon the statutory right is con-
tained only in a general statute rather than in a creating statute.24
Furthermore, the extension of statutes of limitation will not revive a
right, dead under the old statute.25 Such also indicates that a statute
of limitations affects more than the remedy.
Regardless of the possible contentions about the substantive nature
of such statutes, the plain meaning of the language used in this
statute, the construction of the parallel statute, and the vast majority
of contra decisions in other jurisdictions seem to indicate the need
for a new construction of the Kentucky statute in line with the majority
rule. The adoption by the Legislature of new words presents an op-
portunity for the court to rest a new holding upon authority, in order
to overcome the strength of stare decisis.
CHRL~u~s lqicELAm DOYLE
DEGREES OF NEGIaGENCE-NEGLIGENCE PER SE-ExcUSED VIOLATIoNS OF
On n NcE-Blackwell's administrator brought an action against the
Union Light, Heat and Power Co. for wrongful death caused by negli-
gence. The defendant's high tension wires, carrying 13,500 volts, ex-
tended across one end of a vacant lot where Blackwell was helping
the operator of a crane. Blackwell was electrocuted while attempting
to attach the cable of the crane to a bucket directly beneath the wires.
The wires were uninsulated, thus violating an 1896 ordinance of the
city of Newport which required all conducting wires except those for
electric railways to be covered with durable weatherproof insulation
of not less than two coatings. Held: Judgment for defendant was
' 28 YALE L.J. 492, 496 (1919).
- Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953); Order of Travelers
v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947); Maki v. George R. Cooke, supra note 1; Wilson v.
Massengill, 124 F. 2d 666 (6th Cir. 1942); 9 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 723, 726 (1942).
=9 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 723, 726 (1942).
Maki v. George R. Cooke, supra note 1, Contra: McDaniel v. Mulvihill, 263
S.W. 2d 759 (Tenn. 1953).
' Supra note 23, at 725.
